The last (for now) in my series looking at referrer networks among lunatic fringe and disinfo sites that provide much of the ammo used in the Kremlin's information operations. The first part looked at referrers starting with ZeroHedge and using basic snowball methodology. Part two presented the core of that network and the presence of known disinfo sites within it. In part three, I reviewed the reports released so far in 2016 by @EUvsDisinfo and built up an edge list based on reports of disinformation appearing across multiple sites. I then added in referrer data for the sites discussed in part 1. The strong Czech and Slovak presence is on account of the many contributions Evropské Hodnoty has made to the EU anti-disinfo effort. I would expect that many EU countries would find similar sites targeting their own populations, and drawing from the same sites that the Czech and Slovak sites draw from. As with the first part, I'm including an edgelist for this graph. Note: one should probably ignore the arrows in the graph and treat all these relationships as weak reciprocal ties.
© 2015-2016 Andrew Aaron Weisburd